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Electricity market mechanisms designed to steer sustainable generation of electricity play an important role
for the energy transition intended to mitigate climate change. One of the major problems is to complement
volatile renewable energy sources by operationally flexible capacity reserves. In this paper a proposal is given
to determine prices on electricity markets taking into account the operational flexibility of power plants, such that
the costs of long-term capacity reserves can be paid by short-term electricity spot markets. For this purpose, a
measure of operational flexibility is introduced enabling to compute an inflexibility fee charging each individual
power plant on a wholesale electricity spot market. The total sum of inflexibility fees accumulated on the spot
markets then can be used to finance a capacity market keeping the necessary reserves to warrant grid reliability.
Here each reserve power plant then gets a reliability payment depending on its operational flexibility. The
proposal is applied to a small exemplary grid, illustrating its main idea and also revealing the caveat that too
high fees paradoxically could create incentives to employ highly flexible power plants on the spot market rather
than to run them as backup capacity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To mitigate the global climate change it is commonly
agreed that greenhouse gas emissions, and in particular emis-
sions of CO2, have to be reduced substantially [11, 17–
19, 23, 24]. Since 85% of current primary energy driving
global economies are due to the combustion of fossil fuels,
and since consumption of fossil fuels accounts for 56.6% of all
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, introducing renew-
able energy sources to support all areas of human life plays
an essential role in fighting global warming [8]. In particular,
the generation of electricity by renewables will be an impor-
tant step towards this goal, requiring substantial changes to
current grid structures and power plant systems.
If generation and distribution of electricity is to be orga-
nized by market principles, a preeminent challenge of a future
electricity market mechanism design is to set effective price
signals to reward the introduction and the use of renewable
energy sources for the generation of electricity, and simulta-
neously to penalize fossil fuel power plants. However, the
physical requirements of electricity grids and the necessities
of public life in present societies impose special restrictions
on electricity markets. In particular, a necessary condition for
grid stability is the reliability of electricity generation and the
immediate equality of supply and demand at any instant of
time. It is expected that the biggest contribution of renew-
able energy sources in electricity grids will come from wind
turbines and photovoltaic cells [1], both producing electricity
only with high volatility. Their widespread installation there-
fore would challenge the reliability of electricity supply and
thus the stability of the grids. Lacking sufficiently large stor-
ages for electricity, to warrant reliability in grids with volatile
energy sources power plants with high operational flexibility
are required as a power reserve standing in in cases of sud-
den scarcity of electricity supply or of blackouts. Cramton
and Ockenfels [4] proved the “missing money” theorem stat-
ing that, in a competitive electricity market, prices are always
too low to pay for adequate capacity. In fact, present electric-
ity markets are not perfect efficient markets since both supply
and demand are price inelastic, see Figure 1. Future increase
of demand elasticity, for instance by smart grids, would re-
lax the difficulties to a certain degree, but inelasticity on the
supply-side could only be removed by capacity reserves or
huge electricity storages. The first option, however, requires
long-term plannings at a magnitude of decades, whereas the
second option is technologically not realizable to date. For
more details see [5].
Besides these theoretical arguments there also exist em-
pirical clues to doubt that current electricity markets encour-
age investments in operationally flexible power plants or in
the provision of power reserves for cases of emergency or
maintenance [2, 7, 9, 27]. Several solutions to this prob-
lem have been proposed recently to complement the present
“energy-only” markets, ranging from separate capacity mar-
kets which trade backup capacity, to strategic capacity re-
serves usually settled by long-term contracts with national
agencies [2, 4, 9, 13, 15, 21, 26, 27].
The main goal of this paper is to propose a solution for the
economic problem to finance the necessary capacity reserves
guaranteeing grid stability by market principles. One neces-
sary property of a power plant for being part of a capacity
reserve is a fast guaranteed operational flexibility. In our opin-
ion the main problem of current market mechanism designs is
the fact that market prices do not regard operational flexibil-
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FIG. 1: A perfect efficient market where any demand D meets supply S at a certain equilibrium price p∗ and quantity q∗ (left hand). On an electricity spot
market, a blackout is a market failure due to inelastic demand and supply, with the supply curve given by the merit order of the power plant system (right hand).
Here a (“rolling”) blackout occurs if the demand is higher than the total maximum power Pmax of all power plants [5]. Increasing the demand-side inelasticity,
e.g., by smart grids, could remove the problem on the long run, but in the short run electricity markets require capacity reserves which are not demanded for
most of the time.
ity, being determined solely by the marginal costs of electric-
ity generation. Thus the costs of operational inflexibility are
market externalities [3, §14], [20, p 125] and reduce welfare.
By contrast, a sustainable electricity market mechanism de-
sign should induce market prices which take into account both
the direct variable production costs and the external ecologi-
cal costs of electricity production, but also the costs caused by
operational inflexibility of each individual power plant. Due
to emissions trading [28, §15.4], the first two cost factors are
already priced in as marginal costs on present electricity spot
markets, but operational flexibility does not play a role for the
determination of the spot market prices to date. To internal-
ize it into price calculation, at first we define measure for the
operational flexibility of a given power plant. This measure
then can be used to compute an inflexibility fee for each power
plant. The total of these inflexibility fees then can serve to pay
power reserves provided by some given capacity mechanism.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II a general
class of functions measuring the operational flexibility of a
power pant in dependence to its guaranteed start-up time is
defined. In section III the effect of the inflexibility fee on the
offer price of a power plant on an electricity spot market is cal-
culated and demonstrated by a prototypical exemplary “toy”
grid in Example 1. A way how the accumulated inflexibility
fees then can be used to finance a capacity mechanism is de-
scribed in section IV, before a short discussion concludes the
paper.
II. A MEASURE OF THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
OF A POWER PLANT
We stipulate that the operational flexibility of a power plant
depends on its guaranteed start-up time ts ∈ [0,∞) which is
defined as the time that a power plant requires to supply a
guaranteed power of electricity. Moreover, we claim that the
measure should be a pure number expressing a degree of flex-
ibility ranging from 0 to 1, with the property that the longer
the guaranteed start-up time the smaller the value of flexibil-
ity. Consequently, we define a general measure of operational
flexibility to be a strictly monotonically decreasing function
ϕ : [0,∞)→ [0,1] of a single variable satisfying the limit be-
havior
ϕ(x)→ 1 as x → 0, and ϕ(x)→ 0 as x → ∞. (1)
Here the variable x represents the starting time of the power
plant, measured in hours [h]. A simple example of such a
measure is the differentiable function
ϕ(x) = 1
x+ 1
.
x
ϕ(x)
(2)
In the sequel we will use this function to measure the opera-
tional flexibility of a given power plant. In Table I there are
listed guaranteed start-up times ts and the respective flexibil-
ity measures ϕ(ts) for some typical power plants. Note that
Guaranteed Marginal
Power Plant Start-Up ϕ Costs pmc
Time [h] [e/MWh]
wind turbine ∞ .000 —
hydroelectric power station 0.02 .979 —
gas turbine 0.12 .893 90
cogeneration plant (CHP) 0.17 .855 —
combined cycle gas turbine 5 .167 50
hard coal power plant 6 .143 60
lignite power plant 9 .100 40
nuclear power plant 50 .020 5
TABLE I: Exemplary cold start-up times and their respective operational
flexibility measures, as well as exemplary marginal costs (without emissions
trading). The values are typical for current German electricity markets. Data
from [14, p 71] (start-up times) and [16, pp 13, 19], [29, p 3] (marginal costs).
a wind turbine is assigned a vanishing operational flexibility,
since due to the volatility of winds a predetermined amount of
energy by a wind turbine cannot be guaranteed at a given fu-
ture instant. The highest operational flexibilities are exposed
by hydroelectric power stations and modern gas turbines.
3III. FEES ON OPERATIONAL INFLEXIBILITY
On an wholesale electricity market, each participating
power plant operator offers electric power with a sell bid for
each of its power plant. The market maker collects all these
sell bids and determines the market-clearing price in accor-
dance to the buy bids and the merit order [6, 10, 25, 30], for a
theoretical introduction see also [12, §6.5, §7.4.5]. Our main
idea now is to rise a fee for operational inflexibility on each
power plant, its amount being calculated by the operational
flexibility ϕ as part of a factor to a given market-wide refer-
ence level. In consequence, the offer price of each power plant
must take it into account its operational flexibility.
To be more precise, let pmci denote the marginal offer price
per energy quantity of the power plant regarding only the
marginal costs, including the variable costs of production and
emissions trade certificates; this is the price which would be
offered for the power plant on a current wholesale spot market
[29]. Assume moreover that all power plants participating at
the spot market are uniquely numbered by the indices i = 1,
2, . . . , n. The spot market offer price pi of plant i taking into
account its operational flexibility ϕi then is calculated by the
formula
pi = pmci +(1−ϕi) p0. (3)
Here p0 denotes a market-wide constant reference level price,
set by the market authority. It therefore is a political or regula-
tory quantity, not a market-inherent value or immediately eco-
nomically deducible. It is arbitrary in principle, but the higher
its amount the heavier the effect of operational flexibility on
the final spot market price. It should be high enough to signal
effective incentives to introduce and use operationally flexible
power plants for scarcity situations and black-outs, but it must
be low enough to avoid a too radical change of the merit or-
der such that too many flexible power plants are operational
on the spot market and thus unavailable for a capacity reserve
(see Figure 2).
Example 1. Consider a small examplary grid (called “toy
grid” in the sequel) consisting of the eight power plants listed
in Table I. The prices resulting from the respective inflexibil-
ity fees in dependence to different reference level prices p0 are
listed in Table II. If the reference level price is low (here p0
= 10 e/MWh), the modified offer prices do not change the
merit order of the power plant system, whereas a sufficiently
high reference level price (e.g., p0 = 70 e/MWh) changes
it, as is depicted in Figure 2. In our toy grid we can recog-
nize that, if the amount of p0 is too high, the effect may be
even counterproductive since the flexible gas turbine is in the
money and thus operating at a normal quantity demand, leav-
ing no power plant as a capacity reserve. In case of a sudden
scarcity or of a blackout, the grid then would perform worse
than with the original merit order.
Moreover we observe that the higher the reference level
price p0, the higher the spot market price. The amounts, how-
ever, are not related to each other in a linear manner, but de-
pend discontinously on the changes of the merit order. The
total amount of inflexibility fees, at last, is directly calculated
to be either 48.4 e/MWh in case of p0 = 10 e/MWh, or 339
e/MWh in case of p0 = 70 e/MWh.
We finally note that for the demanded quantity q∗ depicted
in the scenarios in Figure 2, only five power plants are oper-
ational. Depending on the reference level price the realized
profit then is given by the following tables.
p0 = 10 e/MWh
Power plant Profit for q
∗
wind turbine 40 e/MWh
hydroelectric 50 e/MWh
CHP 0 e/MWh
lignite 2 e/MWh
nuclear 37 e/MWh
p0 = 70 e/MWh
Power plant Profit for q
∗
wind turbine 27 e/MWh
hydroelectric 95 e/MWh
CHP 37 e/MWh
gas turbine 0 e/MWh
nuclear 24 e/MWh
Assume for simplicity that the demand remains constantly at
q∗ during a certain hour and that all power plants yield the
same power of 5 MW, say, and let be q∗ = 25 MW be the
demanded electrical power for the hour considered (such that
the consumed electricity energy during this period is E = 25
MWh). Then with Table II the total of the inflexibility fees for
the five operational power plants in the money has the amount
of
C f = (10+ 1+ 1+ 9+10) ·5= 205 e/h, (4)
at a reference level price p0 = 10 e/MWh, and
C f = (70+ 1+ 8+ 10+69) ·5= 790 e/h, (5)
at a reference level price p0 = 70 e/MWh. The total fee then
can be distributed to the power plants participating at a capac-
ity mechanism, paying their time of reliability. 
The toy grid in Example 1 demonstrates the possible direct
consequences of the inflexibility fee to the wholesale elec-
tricity market. In essence, by Equation (3) a power plant
with a low operational flexibility is penalized more than one
with a high operational flexibility. In the limit case that all
power plants participating on the spot market are equally op-
erationally flexible, i.e., ϕi = const, all sell bids are raised by
the same amount and the merit order cannot change. On the
other hand, if the power plants have different operational flex-
ibilities and the reference price level p0 is chosen too high,
the merit order changes the merit order such that all flexible
power plants are operational on the spot market, such that no
power plant is left for the capacity reserve necessary to war-
rant grid reliability.
The total amount of inflexibility fees paid for each power
plants participating the spot market now is available for a ca-
pacity mechanism, as described in the following section.
IV. ACCUMULATED INFLEXIBILITY FEES PAYING
CAPACITY RESERVES
A power plant serving as a power reserve for periods of
scarcity or blackouts should have fast and guaranteed start-
up times, i.e., should be operationally flexible to a high de-
gree. There exist several proposed capacity mechanisms, for
4Marginal Price Offer Price
Power Plant ϕ 1−ϕ pmci pi [e/MWh]
[e/MWh] p0 = 10 p0 = 70
wind turbine .000 1.000 1 11 71
hydroelectric power station .980 .020 1 1 2
gas turbine .893 .107 90 91 98
cogeneration plant (CHP) .855 .145 50 51 60
combined cycle gas turbine .167 .833 50 58 108
hard coal power plant .143 .857 60 69 120
lignite power plant .100 .900 40 49 103
nuclear power plant .020 .980 5 15 74
TABLE II: Operational flexibilities, as given by the exemplary data of Table I, and the resulting offer price differences with respect to the reference level prices
p0 = 10 e/MWh and p0 = 70 e/MWh.
hy
dr
o
w
in
d
n
u
cl
ea
r
lig
n
ite CH
P
co
m
bi
n
ed
cy
cl
e
ga
s
ha
rd
co
al
ga
s
tu
rb
in
ep∗
q∗
e/MWh
MW
e/MWh
MW
hy
dr
o
w
in
d
n
u
cl
ea
r
lig
n
ite
CH
P
co
m
bi
n
ed
cy
cl
e
ga
s
ha
rd
co
al
ga
s
tu
rb
in
ep∗
q∗
p0 = 10 e/MWh
hy
dr
o
w
in
d
n
u
cl
ea
r
lig
n
ite CH
P
co
m
bi
n
ed
cy
cl
e
ga
s
ha
rd
co
al
ga
s
tu
rb
in
ep∗
q∗
e/MWh
MW
e/MWh
MW
hy
dr
o C
H
P
w
in
d
n
u
cl
ea
r
ga
s
tu
rb
in
e
lig
n
ite
co
m
bi
n
ed
cy
cl
e
ga
s
ha
rd
co
al
p∗
q∗
p0 = 70 e/MWh
FIG. 2: Effect of the operational inflexibility fee on the price p∗ clearing the market consisting of the power plant system in Table II, neglecting operational
flexibility (left) and regarding it (right). The reference level price are assumed as p0 = 10 e/MWh and p0 = 70 e/MWh, respectively. For a given demand q∗ of
electric power, the market-clearing spot price increases more or less slightly, depending on p0. For a high operational inflexibility fee, as in the second case, the
merit order is changed.
instance capacity markets or a strategic reserve determined by
a grid agency. In either of these approaches, we therefore re-
quire a power plant to offer capacity reserves to have a high
operational flexibility ϕ , say
ϕ > 1
2
. (6)
This value means that the guaranteed start-up time of a power
plant participating the capacity mechanism must be less than
one hour. A further natural requirement is that a power plant
offering its reliability on the capacity market cannot partici-
pate on the spot market.
Assume then that there are k power plants participating on
the capacity market, each one established with a unique index
i = 1, . . . , k. Let ϕi and Pi denote the operational flexibility
and the capacity (measured in MW) of power plant i, respec-
tively, and let C f be the total of inflexibility fees accumulated
on the spot market in a certain past period, say, the day be-
fore. It has the dimension currency per time, for instancee/h.
Then the reliability payment ρi for power plant i in that period
is defined as
ρi =
ϕi Pi
Pflex
C f
[
e
h
]
where Pflex =
k
∑
j=1
ϕ j Pj. (7)
Note that by construction ∑k1 ρi =C f , i.e., the sum over all re-
liability payments equals the total amount of the inflexibility
fees. The quantity Pflex is the weighted sum of all available
capacities, where the weights are precisely the respective op-
erational flexibilities.
Example 2. Assume the toy grid from Example 1. Then by
the requirement (6) only three power plants can participate
5at the capacity market, namely the hydroelectric power sta-
tion, the CHP plant and the gas turbine. In Table III they are
listed with their capacities and the resulting reliability pay-
ments according to Equation (7) and depending on the amount
of total inflexibility fee coming from the spot market. For cal-
culational details refer to the Excel file http://math-it.org/
climate/operational-flexibilities.xls. 
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper a proposal has been worked out to integrate
operational flexibility into the sell bids of power plants partic-
ipating wholesale electricity spot markets. The main idea is
to calculate a fee for each power plant depending on its op-
erational flexibility. For this purpose the concept of a general
measure of operational flexibility of a power plant is intro-
duced here as a strictly monotonically decreasing function ϕ
of the guaranteed start-up time, normed by condition (1). With
such a measure, the inflexibility is priced in by Equation (3)
to the marginal price determining the sell bid of each power
plant at the spot market. The amount depends on a market-
wide reference level price p0 which is set by the market au-
thority or the state. The total operational inflexibility fee C f
accumulated at the spot markets then is spread on the power
plants participating in a given capacity mechanism, depend-
ing on their operational flexibilities according to Equation (7).
Here the power plants forming a capacity reserve should have
a very high operational flexibility, to guarantee reliability and
stability of the grid. A reasonable value is proposed by in-
equality (6). A simple example of a measure for operational
flexibility is given by Equation (2). Using this measure, the
spot market and the corresponding payments to power plants
participating in a capacity mechanism are applied to a simple
but prototypical toy grid in Examples 1 and 2.
The most important consequence of our proposal, as
viewed from an economic perspective, is the internalization of
the negative externality of operational inflexibility of power
plants. With the inflexibility fees determined as above, the
currently external costs would thus be paid by the spot mar-
kets and could be used to pay capacity reserves, be it on a
separate capacity market or another capacity mechanism such
as a pool of power plants forming a strategic reserve. The in-
flexibility fee therefore increases welfare without necessarily
decreasing dispatch efficiency.
A critical point of our approach, however, is the determina-
tion of the reference level price p0. It is crucial since it can
even change the merit order of electricity markets if it is set
very high. Although a change of the merit order in itself does
not necessarily imply severe problems, it could nonetheless
lead to the paradox that operationally flexible power plants
participate in a short-term spot market and therefore could not
serve as a capacity reserve. An amount p0 too high would
thus be adverse to the intention to pay a capacity mechanism
and thus would even diminish welfare. We therefore are faced
with the conflicting objectives of providing enough means to
fund the reserves of a capacity mechanism, and of keeping
suitable power plants with high operational flexibility as ca-
pacity reserve. Although this risk is calculable when choos-
ing the amount for a given grid cautiously such that experi-
ences could be gained over time, a comprehensive theoretical
framework to illuminate effects and limits of inflexibility fees
on electricity markets should be accomplished. Hints to tackle
this problem may be indicated by the optimal taxation due to
Ramsey [22], or by regulation theory [28, §13]. Further re-
search in this direction appears worthwhile.
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